Mixed Accommodations under Rent Control Laws by Willis, John W.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 3 June 1948 Article 2 
1948 
Mixed Accommodations under Rent Control Laws 
John W. Willis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John W. Willis, Mixed Accommodations under Rent Control Laws, 13 MO. L. REV. (1948) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
"MIXED ACCOMMODATIONS" UNDER RENT CONTROL LAWS
JOHN W. WILLIs*
Legislators all over the world have been vexed, in drafting rent-control
laws, by the problem of "mixed accommodations"--premises used both for
business and dwelling use, such as the shop with living quarters behind it, the
doctor's apartment-and-consultation-room, the flat where the dressmaker
lives and plies her needle. If, as is often the case, dwelling premises are
controlled and commercial premises are not, the question is an important
one, since its determination means the difference between control and no
control; but even if commercial rents are subject to regulation, the problem
must be faced if there are differences in the regulations applicable to the two
classes of premises. Three approaches have been employed: the premises
may be regarded as residential in any case (the English rule); or they may
be regarded as not residential, with whatever consequences that entails (the
minority rule); or some kind of a test of "predominant use" may be applied.
THE ENGLISH RULE
The first alternative was adopted in England at an early date. In the
leading case of Epsom Grand Stand Association v. Clarke, decided in 1919,
the Court of Appeals held that a public house was covered by the 1915-1919
Acts if the tenant in fact lived on the premises, and the terms of the rental
agreement did not forbid it. Bankes, L. J., said that "'The object of the
legislature was to include all houses which are occupied as dwelling-houses,
provided they are of the class ascertained by their value as prescribed by
the Act, notwithstanding that they are also used by the tenant for other
purposes as well as those of a dwelling-house." The rule of this case was
written into the 1920 Act, which provides that "the application of this Act
to any house or part of a house shall not be excluded by reason only that
part of the premises is used as a shop or office or for business, trade or profes-
sional purposes. '"2 At the time the 1920 Act was passed, business premises
were also regulated, but the provision just quoted has been retained in
effect although control of business premises lapsed in 1921. The Inter-
*Member of the California Bar and of the Bars of the United States Supreme
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
1. [1919] W.N. 170, 35 T.L.R. 525 (C.A.).
2. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
GEo. V, c. 17, § 12(2) (ii). See also Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act,
1939, 2 & 3 GEO. VI, c. 71, § 3(3).
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Departmental Committee which recently studied the whole subject of rent
control in Great Britain was asked to recommend decontrol of all mixed
accommodations,3 or at least of all but small premises where the tenant of
the dwelling portions carried on a business, trade or profession on the prem-
ises,4 but it did not do so.5
Under the 1920 Act, if the letting is for the purpose of residence even
in a minor degree, the preniises are controlled even though the dominant
purpose of the letting is for use as business premisesyca Thus, for example,
*a public house has been held to come within the Acts;0 or a shop with living
accommodations attached;z or a garage with rooms over it;" or a building
used partly for a hotel and partly for living purposes; 9 or a house let to an
"urban district council" for a residence for their surveyor and a meeting
place for the council;' 0 or a house used as a nursing home," The lessee must,
actually live on the premises; where living quarters attached to a shop were
unoccupied, the Acts were held .not to apply.2
3. Memorandum by the Council of the Law Society, p. 3 (1944).
4. Memorandum by the Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute, pp. 11-12
(1944).
5. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee'on Rent Control, Cmd.
6621 (1945).
5a. Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Law Notes, 19th ed.) 95-97.
In Waller & Son v. Thomas, [1921] 1 K.B. 541 (1920), McCardie, J., said that
the "dominant purpose and principal user" should be determinative, but held
himself bound by the Epsom case. See also Greig v. Francis & Campion; 38
T.L.R. 519 (K.B. 1922) ("real, main and substantial purpose of the premises"):
Callaghan v. Bristowe, [1920] W.N. 308, 89 L.J.K.B. 817, 123 L.T. 622, 36 T.L.R.
841 (The Epsom case. "is one case, but there are others in which no one could
say that the premises were let as a dwelling-house, e.g., that of a large warehouse
containing a couple of rooms only, with a small room for a caretaker. Plainly,
such premises would not be let as a dwelling-house.")
The editors of Law Notes comment that "... there is much to be said on
juristic ,grounds for the 'dominant purpose' of the letting, and it is perhaps open
to the Court of Appeal to reconsider the point." Op. cit. supra, p. 96.
6. Epsom Grand Stand Assn. v. Clarke, supra n. 1; Waller & Son v.
Thomas, supra n. 5a; Brakspear & Sons, Ltd. v. Barton, [1924] 2 K.B. 88. Most
public houses Were subsequently excepted from the Acts by the Rent and
Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act 1933, 23 & 24 GEo. V, c. 32,
§ 1(3); see also the 1939 Act, supra, n. 2, § 3(2)(a).
7. Cohen v. Benjamin, 39 T.L.R. 10 (K.B. 1922) (shop, bakehouse and
rooms); Edwards v. Rimmer, Est. Gaz. Dig. 1925, 362; Greig v. Francis &
Campion, 38 T.L.R. 519 (K.B, 1922).
8. Callaghan v. Bristowe, supra n. 5a (tenant's chauffeur occupied the
rooms). But cf. Gidden v. Mills, [1925] 2 KB. 713; Oatvay Bros. v. Munday,
Est. Gaz. Dig. 1924, 79 (stable with living quarters above held on the facts
to be let as business premises).
9. Plunkett v. Lenehan, 62 Ir.L.T.R. 29 (1928). Bums v. Radcliffe,
[1923] 2 I.R. 159 (Northern Ireland C.A.).
10. West v. Wrotham, U.D.C., Est. Gaz., Oct. 20, 1923.
11. Lewis v. Weston, Est. Gaz., July 5, 1925.
12. Sanderson v. Gibbons, Est. Gaz. Dig. 1924, 306 (C.A.).
, [Vol. 13
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The Scottish Court of Session has held that a shop was not controlled,
even though it was let in the same lease with dwelling quarters and at a
single rent, and there was intercommunication between the two premises,
where the shop was not "part" of the house. 3 This divisibility test is perhaps
more logical, but not as practical a's the English rule, since it would not be
of much help to the tenant in most cases to have security of tenure as to
the living quarters and not be protected as to the shop.
The coverage, while it applies, extends to the whole premises: the court
cannot give the landlord possession of the business portion or apportion the
rent.14 However, the Acts cease to apply to the business portion if it is later
rented separately's or if the tenants sublets the residential part.' 6
The English statute has been copied in Ireland,17 the Antipodes,'8 and
in a handful of the British colonies. 19 Thd New Zealand Court of Appeal
followed the Epsom case in a 1934 decision,20 and its principle was written
into the 1942 statute.21 The first Australian regulations included mixed
accommodations in the definition of "dwelling house," although shops were,
also controlled. 22 The English rule was followed in a Bombay decision;2 3
but the statute was later amended to adopt a different test.24 Siam"5 and
Peru2 6 have followed the English practice. An early Italian statute27 provided
that when the same building was used for commercial, office or studio pur-
poses and for a dwelling, the latter use should be considered prevailing; but
the later statutes employed a different standard. 2 The Swiss law on control
13. McClymont's Trustees v. Ross, [1929) Sess Cas. 585.
14. Ellen v. Goldstein, 89 L.J. Ch. 586 (1920).
15. Phillips v. Hallahan, [1925] 1 K.B. 756.
16. Haskins v. Lewis, [1931] 2 K.B. 1; Gidden v. Mills, [1925] 2 K.B. 713.
17. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1923, No. 19
of 1923, § 3(2) (ii); Rent Restrictions Act, 1946, No. 4 of 1946, § 4.
18. See nn. 20-22, infra; but see nn. 30, 31.
19. British Guiana, No. 23 of 1941, § 3(3); Gibraltar, No. 4 of 1938, § 6(2)(ii); Newfoundland, No. 45 of 1943, § 2(b) (ii); Northern Rhodesia, No. 3 of 1943,
82.
20. Public Trustee v. Merry, [1934] N.Z.L.R. 934 (C.A.).
21. Fair Rents Amendment Act, 1942, No. 19 of 1942, 6 GEo. VI p. 165, § 6.
22. National Security (Fair Rents) Regulations, S.R. 1939, No. 104, Reg. 2.
These regulations were superseded by the National Security (Landlord and Tenant)
Regulations, S.R. 1941, No. 275, which contained no comparable provision.
23. Lakshman v. Balkrishna, 27 Bombay L.R. 937.
24. Act No. 3 of 1925.
25. Emergency Rent Control Act, B.E. 2489, § 5 (1946) ("House" means a
construction used as an abode, regardless of whether or not it is also used for the
purpose of carrying out business, trade or industry).
26. Law No. 10,222, Art. 4 (1945) (Dwelling does not lose character as
such for purpose of rent law because industrial, commercial or professional activities
are carried on within it).
27. R.D.L. 477, Art. 8 (1920).
28. See n. 48, infra.
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of house rents also covers commercial accommodations which are connected
to a dwelling accommodation in such a measure that they cannot be used
separately without "notable prejudice.12
THE MINORITY RULE
The second alternative referred to above-treating mixed accommo-
dations as not dwelling accommodations-has been adopted in only a few
jurisdictions. New South Wales decontrolled mixed accommodations at the
same time that shops were decontrolled, in 1928, and did not reestablish
control until 1939.30 The Victoria Act of 1938 also treated mixed accommo-
dations as not subject to control.31 Palestine in 1934 excluded from the
residential rent control ordinance "any part of a building let together with
any part of a building used for professional or commercial purposes. 812
Canada put mixed accommodations (a structure or part of a structure used
for combined business and dwelling purposes, where the rent is not appor-
tioned) under the commercial rather than the residential regulations. 3 The
1946 law in Rumania provides that a building of which part is used as a
dwelling and the rest for trade or industry, shall be regarded as entirely
commercial. 4
THE 'PREDOMINANT USE' RULE
The "predominant use" test is probably more scientific and sensible
than the other two tests which have been discussed, although it is less easy
to administer. Under this standard, whether premises are to be treated as
residential or commercial depends upon the "main" or "predominant" or
"principal" use of the premises. Sometimes a separability test may also be
employed, although this is not always true.
The predominant use standard was employed by the Office of Price
Administration from the start. In an interpretation issued in July 1942,11
the Office stated that
"In determinations as to the extent of control of property
used for both dwelling and business purposes, two tests are to be
29. Arret6 du Conseil F6d6ral, Oct. 15, 1941, Art. 12, as amended by Arrete6
of Feb. 8, 1946.
30. No. 37 of 1939, § 3(1)(c); (d).
31. Fair Rents Act of 1938, Act. No. 4626, § 2, suspended by Act. No. 4686
(1939).
32. No. 11 of 1934, § 2. See n. 44, infra.
33. Wartime Prices & Trade Board, Order 294, § 1(c)(iv); Order 315, § l(b)
(iv). Order 315, on commercial rents, was revoked as of March 8, 1948 by Order
772 (Oct. 24, 1947)..
34. Law No..330, Art. 7 (1946).
35. Interpretation 1 (a)-I (originally issued as a Regional Rent Memorandum
on July 24, 1942).
(Vol. 13.280 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
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used: First, are the business and dwelling portions separable, and,
second, if they are not, what is the predominant use? If the business
and dwelling portions are separable, only the dwelling portion is
subject to the Regulations. If they are not separable, then either
both portions are subject to the Regulations or neither is controlled.
The result under such circumstances depends upon predominant
use."
The interpretation went on to state that accommodations are separable if
they are in separate structures, or if they are in the same structure but there
are separate means of access, the dwelling portion can be used as such without
need for access to the business portion, the use of the business portion does
not require access to the dwelling portion, and the dwelling portion is, or can
readily be, completely shut off from the business portion .3 Even if all these
tests were not met the premises might be found separable if it was very clear
that, "by the standards and practices of the community," it was feasible
for the tenant to occupy the dwelling portion while the business portion was
being used by another. When the premises were not separable, the predom-
inant use test came into play.
. "The initial test of predominant use is to be made on a space
basis. If a predominant part of the space is used for-business pur-
poses, the property is, not subject to the Regulation. Where less
than a predominant part of the space is used for business purposes
(and also where the space test cannot be used because there is no
physical segregation of the space used for business purposes and
that used for dwelling purposes), a second test of predominant use,
in terms of rental value, is to be used. If the rental value of the
business portion (or of the business use, where the two uses are
not physically segregated) is clearly in excess of the rental value
of the dwelling portion, the property is not subject to the Regula-
tion; otherwise it is subject.' ' 37
36. See In the Matter of Baywood Homes, Inc., 3 PIKE & FISCHER OPA OP. &
DEC. 3155 (1945); Bria v. Isaacman, 51 Pa. D. & Co., 368 (1944 (owner can
recover possession of business portion of combined accommodations, where the prem-
ises are divisible); cf. Jeka v. Pradovis, 5 PIKE & FIsCHER OPA OP. & DEC. 5042
(Wis. Circ. Ct. 1946) (combined premises held separable although a single heating
plant served both portions and the dwelling portion could not be completely shut
off from the business part).
37. See In the Matter of Park View Apts., 2 PIKE & FIsCHER OPA Op. & DEC.
3276 (OPA 1945); In the Matter of Unibra Realties, Inc., 3 id. 3198 (OPA 1945);
In the Matter of Empra Realty Co., 5 id. 3059 (OPA 1946); Porter v. Beall, 4 id.
5166 (N.D. Ohio, 1946); McCarey v. New Hotel Oaks Holding Corp., 2 id. 5103
(N.D. Fla. 1944); Morrison v. Taylor, 145 F. 2d 466 (C.C.A. 5th 1944); cf.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Schmidtman, 70 Wash. L. Rep. 105 (D.C. Mun. Ct.,
1942); Westchester Apts. v. Keroes, 71 Wash. L. Rep. 1077 (D.C. Mun. Ct., 1943),
aff'd on other grounds.
5
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These tests were applied by the OPA in a number of cases and were
generally followed by the courts.38 Before the tests can even come into play,
however, it must be shown that there is a commercial use; where premises
were used solely for dwelling purposes, with the knowledge and consent of
the landlord, it was immaterial that part could have been used commercially
or that the premises may have been rented for combined commercial and
residential use.3 9
The "predominant use" .test has been applied, in various forms, in a
considerable number of jurisdictions. In the British West Indies and Malta
the standard is whether the accommodations are used "mainly" as a dwell-
ing.40 The South Australia Act of 1942 applies to "any premises a substantial
part of which is leased for residence and the rest for a shop, storeroom,
workshop, stable, etc.'14 , The Bombay Act was amended in 1925 to apply to
premises used "wholly or principally" as a dwelling-house. 42 The Nigeria
and Gambia ordinances of the 1920's applied to a dwelling also used by the
tenant for trade if no substantial part of the rent was payable in respect of
the portion so used, 43 and this was copied in the Palestine ordinance of
1940.44" In the Straits Settlements, the court (later the board) decided
whether any particular house was let chiefly for business, trade or profes-
sional purposes, and hence not controlled, considering the nature and
importance of the business, trade or profession. 45 The Portuguese Supreme
Court held in 1922 that the question was determined by the nature and use
of the most important or most lucrative part of the building;40 a 1946
decision held that a house let for use as a dwelling and a "casa de passe" was
38. See nn. 36, 37, supra; Glomb v. Caiati, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (1st Dep't 1947);
Bonanno v. Bollo, 50 A. 2d 621 (R.I. 1946). But cf. Lambert y. Larson, 2 PIKE
& FISCHER OPA Op. & DEc. 5168 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1945) (tenant of service station
including living quarters held entitled to continue in occupation of living quarters
after expiration of lease of stition). See also Ridolfi v. Benton, 58 A. 2d 723 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1948) (barber shop and apartment on same floor not subject to rent
law where apartment could not be used separately and main use of premises was
commercial). Cf. Kessler v. Grasser, 300 Ky. 89, 187 S.W. 2d 1012 (1945).
39. In the Matter of Max Horwitz, 2 PIKE & FISCHER OPA Op. & DeC. 3137
(OPA 1944).
40. Trinidad, No. 34 of 1933, as amended by No. 36 of 1939, § 3(5); No. 13
of 1941, § 2; Antigua, No. 5 of 1942; § 2; Dominica, No. 19 of 1942, § 2; Jamaica,
No. 17 of 1944, § 2; St. Christopher & Nevis, No. 1 of 1945 § 2; St. Lucia, No. 3
of 1943, § 2; St. Vincent, No. 3 of 1945, § 2; Malta, No. 16 of 1944, § 2.
41. Act No. 33 of 1942, § S (IV).
42. Act No. 3 of 1925.
43. Nigeria, No. 8 of 1920, § 5(4); Gambia, No. 22 of 1922, § 3(3).
44. No. 44 of 1940, § 3 (2).
45. No. 3 of 1921, § 2(1)(ii).
46. Sup. Trib. de Justiga, D'ec. 2, 1922, 55 0 Direito 43.
(Vol. 13
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to be regarded as residential where the two parts could not be distinguished.4 7
The prevailing use test was employed in Italy,4s although in at least one
decree it was provided that if part of a building was used for a dwelling and
part for other use or if a dwelling and other premises were let at a single
rent, the judge or commissar could apportion the rent.49 In Fiume, the
"essentially most important object of the lease" was to be considered in
determining the character of the accommodation." A Rumanian statute
provided that in the case of premises occupied by artisans, the arbitral
commission decided Whether the principal object of the lease was use as an
atelier or as a dwelling; if the character of a dwelling predominated, the law
applied, and in any case it applied to a single room serving both purposes,
and a dwelling of a worker who worked at home was not considered an
atelier.' The new Spanish rent control law, which covers both dwellings
and "locales de negocio" with some variations in the provisions applicable
to each, provides that a lease of a dwelling does not lose its character as such
because the tenant, the tenant's spouse or a relative of one or the other
within the third degree residing with one of them carries on a profession,
public function or "pequefia industria domestica" in the dwelling; and
similarly that a lease of a "local de negocio" does not lose its character
because the lessee, his family or employees reside on the premises.5 2 The
Belgian Court of Cassation held in 1922 that the rent laws applied although
the tenant exercised a commerce or industry in the rented unit, unless it
was used, if not exclusively, at least principally for commercial or industrial
purposes. "3 The 1923 law specifically provided that mixed accommodations
should be covered only if the 1914 rent was less than a stated amount."
The courts held that whether an accommodation was "mixed" within the
meaning of the law depended on whether the tenant actually lived there
47. Martins v. da Silva, Sup. Trib. de Justiga, May 22, 1946, VI. Boletim
Oficial 236. See Anselmo de Castro, Arrendamentos mixtos para o comercio e
indfjstria, 2 Revisto de Direito e de Estudos Sociais 397 (Coimbra, 1947).
48. R.D. 8, Art. 15 (1923); R.D.L. 563, Art. 1 (1934); D.L.L. 669, Art. 5
(1945).
49. R.D. 1653, Art. 6 (1928) (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica).
50. Decree Law 1750, Art. 4 (1921).
51. Law of March 27, 1924, Art. 2.
52. Law of December 31, 1946, Arts. 7, 9.
53. Socit6 Comptoir Charbonnier Maritime c. Tielemans, Phs. Belge 1922
I 412 (Cass. July 20, 1922). See also Deflandre c. Leloup, Pas. Belge 1921 III
124 (Trib. Civ. Mons., March 18, 1921).
54. Law of Feb. 20, 1923, Art 3 § 1(3).
7
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and not on whether he could,55 and that occupation by a subtenant ' or the
manager of the tenant's business57 was insufficient to bring it under the law.
Where occupation is merely accessory to the business use, the premises
are regarded as commercial. 8
Separate residential and commercial accommodations in the same build-
ing will usually be treated separately for purposes of determining maximum
rents.5 9
ROOMING HousEs
Underlying leases of rooming or boarding houses present a special
problem. As between the landlord and the main tenant, is the lease one for
business or residential purposes? Courts in the United States and in Great
Britain and other parts of the British Empire have generally held that the
letting is a residential one.60 Only a few decisions take the contrary view.0'
55. Van Ramenant c. Lemmens, Pas. BeIge 1927 I 85 (Cass. Nov. 12, 1926).
56. Verse-Van Roye c. DeMeeter, Pzrs. Belge 1925 I 272 (Cass. June 4,
1925); contra, Union Cooperative c. Wintgens, Pas. Beige 1924 I 62 (Trib. Civ.
Verviers, No. 7, 1923).
57. Petitiean c. Delhaise Frres et Cie., Pas. BeIge 1923 III 95 (J. P.
Anderme, April 18, 1923).
58. Capel c-, Sirey Rec. Gen. 1921 II 18 (France, Comm. Sup. de Cass.,
June 16, 1921) (manager of cafe resided on premises); Hoosaien v. Parker,
S. Afr. L. Rep. [19441 A.D. 481 (residential portion was occupied in connection
with shop and someone had to be there to prevent burglary); Petitjean c. Delhaise
Fr~res et Cie., supra n. 57.
59. Italy D.L.L. 669, Art. 5 (1945); Venezuela, Decree 184 (1946). See Ri-
dolfi v. Benton, 58 A. 2d 723 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948) (barber shop on first floor
and apartment on second floor were not a single unit where they were capable of
being used separately and in fact had been).
60. Edwards v. Woods, F. 2d (C.C.A. 8th, June 11, 1948); Wilner v. Vartnian,
55 A. 2d 88 (D.C. Mun. App. 1947);. Lingo v. Wolfe, 37 A. 2d 270 (D.C. Mun. App.
1944) (purpose of Act to protect tenants in possession, who would be discommoded
by changes in landlords); Coils v. Parnham, [1922] 1 K.B. 325 (1921) (applying §
12 (2)(ii) of 1920 Act, supra n. 2); Vickery v. Martin, [1944] 2 All E. R. 167 (same);
Prout v. Hunter, [1924] 2 K.B. 365 (a business premises is one where a business is
carried on, and while tenant may be carrying on business of letting flats, he does
not carry it on in the flats themselves); Ebner v. Lascelles, [1928] 2 K.B. 486;
Crankshaw v. Donnelly, Est. Gaz. Dig. 1925, 446; Sissons Cafe v. Barber, Est.
Gaz. Dig. 1929, 177; Burns v. Radcliffe, [1923] 2 I.R. 158 (N.I. 1923); Jupp v.
Berry-Good, S.Afr.L.Rep. [1921] W.L.D. 39; Levy v. Lamberg, S.Afr.L.Rep.
[1943] T.P.D. 410; Rex v. Bernstein, S.Afr.L.Rep. [1944] A.D. 523; Law v.
Smith, [1944] 4 D.L.R. 70 (British Columbia C.A.); MacDonald v. Mitchell,
[1945] 1 D.L.R. 250 (Nova Scotia Sup. Ct. 1944); Ramparikhan Singh v. Pollard,
[1922] L.R.B.G. 136 (British Guiana; see In the Matter of Francis G. Wadleigh,
3 PIKE & FIsCHER OPA Op. & DEC. 3151 (OPA 1945).
In some of these cases the main tenant lived on the premises, in other, cases
he did not.
61 Curtis v. Devlin, [1942] N.Z.L.R. 197 (Sup. Ct.); Kirkland v. Anderson,
36 Mag.Ct.Rep. 41 (N.Z.Mag.Ct. 1941) (house let as a boarding or apartment
house not covered even though only tenant and relatives actually lived there);
In re Kleckner & Lane, [19441 3 W.W.R. 43 (Sask.Dist.Ct.) (tenant sublet the
entire house to various subtenants; one subtenant bought the house and evicted
the tenant on the theory that the accommodations were commercial); Mazloum
8
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INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
Whatever test is followed, the intention of-the parties must be given
weight. Mixed accoinmodations can be regarded as residential only if the
parties contemplated occupancy by the tenant as a dwelling, and business
premises cannot be brought under residential rent control by an unauthorized
use for dwelling purposes.6 2 As an English judge has said, "If an agreement
were to let premises as a barn, the tenant though he lived there could not
be heard to say that they were let as a dwelling-house." 63 Thus, where prem-
ises are rented as business premises, the tenant cannot by living in them with-
out the landlord's knowledge or consent change their status or bring them
under residential rent control.64 Where the lease is silent as to user or permits
either residential or business user, the actual use by the tenant is determi-
native. =i If the landlord knows of the residential use and consents to it,
or fails to object, the premises will be considered as residential. 6
v. Froment, 10 Gaz. des Tribs. Mixtes d'Egypte 84 (Trib. des Rff6r6s, Cairo, 1920)(law does not apply to a tenant who having rented an apartment for personal
habitation has installed a pension).
In Tompkins v. Rogers, [1921] 2 K.B. 94, the court held that premises occupied
by the tenant and used for taking in lodgers were being used for business purposes.
However, business premises were controlled at that time and the effect of the
decision was to protect the tenant. The case was distinguished in Colls v. Parnham,
supra n. 60.
62. "The important matter is the rights under the lease, not the de facto
use." Barrett v. Hardy Bros. [1925] 2 K.B. 220, 227.
63. Epsom Grand Stand Assn. v. Clarke, as reported in (1919) W.N. 170.
64. Butcher v. Murray, Est. Gaz. Dig. 1926, 275; Cook Bros. v. Rogers, Est.
Gaz. Aug. 4, 1923; Williams v, Perry, [1924] 1 K.B. 936; Alexander v. Adams,[1936] Scots L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 32; Gardiner & Co. v. Deptford Liberal Club, Est. Gaz.
Dig. 1924, 55; Asilo Francisco Diaz de Leon v. Valdovinos, 21 Los Tribunales 330(Civil Court of Mexico City, 1943); Schoull c. Alexandre, Dalloz Rec. Heb. 1928,
546 (France, Comm. Sup. Cass. July 28, 1928); Massicault c. Gaillard, Sirey Rec.
Gen. 1921 II 6 (Comm. Sup. Cass. April 21, 1921); Piedsocq c.-, id. 18 (Comm.
Sup. Cass., June 23, 1921); Gandisart c. Prilippart, Pas. Belge 1926 I 35 (Cass.
Oct. 29, 1925).
65. Gidden v. Mills, [1925] 2 K. B. 713; Shooter v. Gaitley, 80 S.J. 74 (1936);
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